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ACTUALITY AND ANSELM* 
 
1. Introduction. 
In 'Anselm and Actuality', David Lewis argued that the assessment of Anselm's 
ontological arguments is best achieved when the familiar modal expressions in 
which the arguments are typically formulated are translated into counterpart 
theory. Once the arguments are translated into the language of counterpart 
theory—into non-modal, ordinary reasoning about possible things—then we can 
apply our well-known and widely accepted standards for validity. We can then 
determine—ideally once and for all—whether these perennially debated 
arguments are successful.  
Given an obscure modal argument, we can translate it into a 
nonmodal argument—or into several nonmodal arguments, if the 
given argument was ambiguous. Once we have a nonmodal 
argument, we have clear standards of validity; and once we have 
nonmodal translations of the premises, we can understand them well 
enough to judge whether they are credible. Foremost among our 
modal headaches is Anselm's ontological argument.1 
 The distinctive advantage of Lewis's approach to Anselm's ontological 
argument is that counterpart theory combined with the vast domain of Lewis's 
pluriverse makes a perfectly extensional interpretation of the ontological argument 
possible. On Lewis's approach, modal operators are replaced with quantifiers 
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ranging over worlds and possibilia, modal propositions occurring in Anselm's 
ontological arguments are translated into non-modal propositions, and Anselm's 
modal arguments are translated into the familiar lexicon of non-modal arguments. 
The modal reduction puts us in a better position to assess the credibility of 
Anselm's premises. The translation of Anselm's ontological argument into one—
or many, as it happens—non-modal arguments permits the application of well-
known and widely accepted standards of validity—the standards of classical 
logic—to determine the cogency of Anselm's argument. 
 It is indeed a fruitful and fascinating project to translate Anselm's 
ontological arguments into the extensional language of counterpart theory. But 
translating Anselm into counterpart theory—granting that there is a good 
translation—is much less philosophically neutral than Lewis suggests.   
 Lewis's translations of premises (2) and (3) of Anselm's argument are 
extraordinarily strong propositions. Indeed, they are much stronger propositions 
than are required for the ontological argument.  Lewis concludes that the 
necessary counterpart theoretic translations of premise (3)—his premises (3A) and 
(3C)—are not credible. And indeed many will find them incredible. But (3A) and 
(3C) are not necessary to a valid formulation of the ontological argument. There 
are weaker translations of premises (2) and (3) available that many will find 
credible.   
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 In sections (2) – (4) I present Lewis's formulation of the ontological 
argument in Anselm's Proslogium II. (2) focuses primarily on the translation of 
premise (1) into the language of counterpart theory, and sections (3) – (4) focus on 
translations of premises (2) – (3) respectively. In section (3) several translations of 
premises (2) are advanced—(2.1) – (2.6). It is argued (2.1) – (2.6) improve in a 
variety of ways upon Lewis's translation of Anselm's premise (2). In sections (4) – 
(6) Lewis's translation of premise (3) in (3A) is discussed in detail. It is argued that 
the ontological arguer should replace Lewis's (3A) with (3A') or, perhaps better, 
(3E). The corresponding conclusion of Anselm's ontological argument is (C'').  
The argument in translation is valid and its premises are all plausible—faro more 
plausible than those offered in Lewis's original translation. Some concluding 
remarks are offered in section (7). 
2. Premise (1) 
 The version of the ontological argument that Lewis considers is from 
Proslogium II. Lewis formulates the argument in English as follows. 
Premise 1. Whatever exists in the understanding can be conceived to exist in 
reality.  
Premise 2. Whatever exists in the understanding would be greater if it existed in 
reality than if it did not.  
Premise 3. Something exists in the understanding, than which nothing greater can 
be conceived.  
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Conclusion. Something exists in reality, than which nothing greater can be 
conceived. 
Premise (1), Premise (2) and the Conclusion all employ the locution 'exists in 
reality'. Lewis renders the locution 'x exists in the understanding' as 'x is an 
understandable being'. He does not commit himself on the existence of 
understandable beings, but leaves the analysis of that phrase to the ontological 
arguer. Concerning premise (1), Lewis argues that its proper translation into 
counterpart theory is in (1) 
1. ∀x(Ux ⊃ ∃w(Ww & xEw)) 
In quasi-English, (1) states that, for any understandable being x, there is a world w 
such that x exists in w. Lewis does not talk explicitly of beings existing in the 
understanding, and indeed regards quantificational talk in relation to the 
understanding as ill-advised. 
It is ill-advised to speak of them as existing in the understanding: 
they do not bear to the understanding the same relation which 
something existing in a world bears to that world! Let us simply call 
them understandable beings.2 
Beings that exist in the understanding are just those beings—merely possible or 
actual—that have the property of being understandable. According to premise (1), 
every understandable being exists somewhere in reality.  
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 Existing in reality, as Lewis translates that phrase in premise (1), is existing in 
some world or other in the pluriverse. The pluriverse is the totality of metaphysical 
reality and is the largest domain of quantification. So, the quantifiers in (1) are 
absolutely unrestricted, quantifying over the largest domain of discourse. The 
largest domain of discourse for Lewis includes everything in every world, and 
perhaps much more than that.3 It is conceivable that x exists, according to (1), just 
in case (unrestrictedly) x exists. The locution that (unrestrictedly) x exists is true 
just in case x exists somewhere in metaphysical space. x exists, that is, just in case 
x inhabits (or just is) some possible world, including of course the actual world. 
It is our plan to reason explicitly about possible worlds and possible 
things therein. These possible beings will be included in our domain 
of discourse. The idioms of quantification, therefore, will be 
understood as ranging over all the beings we wish to talk about, 
whether existent or nonexistent.4 
 The worlds in question are conceivable worlds, which may not coincide with 
the metaphysically possible worlds or with possible worlds simpliciter.5 So, 
premise (1) comes to the assertion, on Lewis's rendering, that understandable 
beings are among the beings in the broadest domain of discourse. It is difficult not 
to see that assertion as trivial. Could there be an understandable being that is not in 
the broadest domain of discourse? (1') is just the negation of (1), so (1) is false just 
in case (1') is true. 
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1'.  ∃x(Ux & ~∃w(Ww & xEw)) 
(1') states that there exists an understandable being that exists no where in reality. But 
given Lewis's understanding of quantification, (1') is either trivially false or 
incoherent. It misunderstands the univocity of quantificational idioms.  
We of the establishment think that there is only one kind of 
quantification. The several idioms of what we call 'existential' 
quantification are entirely synonymous and interchangeable. It does 
not matter whether you say 'Some things are donkeys' or 'There are 
donkeys' or 'Donkeys exist'- you mean exactly the same thing 
whichever way you say it. The same goes for more vexed cases: it 
does not matter whether you say 'Some famous fictional detective 
uses cocaine', 'There is a famous fictional detective who uses 
cocaine', or 'A famous cocaine-using fictional detective exists'- 
whether true or whether false, all three statements stand or fall 
together.6 
If there are understandable beings, then they must exist in the largest domain of 
discourse. (1') therefore seems trivially false, and (1) trivially true. And if 
understandable beings exist somewhere in the totality of reality, then, they exist in 
the same way that any actual being exists. If a round square or the largest prime 
enjoys the property of being understandable—if round squares and largest primes 
are understandable objects—then a round square and a largest prime exists 
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somewhere in reality. These objects exist, again, in the very same way that any 
actual object exists. For Lewis, quantificational idioms are univocal. There isn't 
existence on the one hand, and other sorts of being on the other.7 
 If the largest domain includes objects that exist in no possible world at all, 
then it might be that (1) is false. Lewis acknowledges that numbers and 
propositions—and perhaps cross-world objects—do not exist in any possible 
world, though they are no doubt understandable objects.  
When we evaluate the truth of a quantified sentence, we usually 
restrict the domain and quantify over less than all there is. If we 
evaluate a quantification at a world, we will normally omit many 
things not in that world, for instance the possible individuals that 
inhabit other worlds. But we will not omit the numbers, or some of 
the other sets. Let us say that an individual exists from the 
standpoint of a world iff it belongs to the least restricted domain 
that is normally—modal metaphysics being deemed abnormal—
appropriate in evaluating the truth at that world of quantifications. I 
suppose that this domain will include all the individuals in that 
world; none of the other individuals; and some, but not all, of the 
sets. There will be many sets that even exist from the standpoint of 
all worlds, for instance the numbers. Others may not; for instance 
the unit set of a possible individual might only exist from the 
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standpoint of the world that the individual is in. Thus we have three 
relations: being in a world, i.e. being part of a world; being partly in 
a world, i.e. having a part that is wholly in that world; and existing 
from the standpoint of a world. Postulate 2, the principle that 
nothing is in two worlds, applies only to the first of these.8 
 Objects that exist from the standpoint of all possible worlds—things such as 
numbers, properties, propositions, and events—do not exist in any possible 
worlds.  The distinction is a particularly important one for the Anselmian 
argument, since God might be among the objects that exist in reality—that exist 
from the standpoint of every possible world—but do not exist in any possible 
world. We might also want to acknowledge those understandable beings that do 
not wholly exist in any possible world, but that have parts in various possible 
worlds. So, the largest domain of discourse might include understandable 
individuals that do not exist in any possible world: individuals that, strictly 
speaking, are not possible individuals. It might include understandable objects, 
too, that exist from the standpoint of every world but do not exist in any world. 
These sorts of objects would render (1) false as well. 
3. Premise (2) 
 According to premise (2), whatever exists in the understanding would be 
greater if it existed in reality than if it did not. Beings that exist in the 
understanding, recall, are just the understandable beings. So, premise (2) states that 
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if x is an understandable being, then x would be greater if it existed in reality than 
if it did not.  
 Premise (2) entails that existing in reality is what we might call a great-making 
property of understandable beings. Since, according to (1), every understandable 
being exists in some world or other, Lewis urges that every understandable being 
conceivably has the great-making property of existing in reality. The great-making 
property of existing in reality is a property that objects exemplify in certain 
possible worlds—those in which they exist—and a property that objects fail to 
exemplify in certain possible worlds—those in which they fail to exist. There are, 
according to Lewis's rendering of premise (2), no objects that are simply greater 
than others. The greatness of objects is relativized to possible worlds. For objects 
x and y, it is not true that x is simply greater than y, but it might be true that x in w 
is greater than y in w'. So, according to Lewis, the proper translation of premise 
(2) into counterpart theory is in (2). 
2. ∀x ∀w ∀v (Ux & Ww & Wv & xEw & ~xEv ⊃ xwGxv) 
In quasi-English, (2) states that, for any understandable being x, and for any 
worlds w and v, if x exists in w but x does not exist in v, then the greatness of x in 
w exceeds the greatness of x in v. 
 It's important to observe that Anselm's premise (2) does not talk explicitly 
about greatness relative to worlds or the greatness of object x in w. Premise (2) states 
that whatever exists in the understanding would be greater if it existed in reality 
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than if it did not. The reading of premise (2), taken at face value, is that if x exists 
in reality then x is greater simpliciter than if x does not exist in reality. And Anselm 
certainly seems to mean by x's existing in reality that x actually exists.  If x actually 
exists then x is greater than if x does not. For Lewis, this is equivalent to saying 
that if x exists in our particular region metaphysical space, then x is greater than if 
x does not exist in our region. Actual existence is a great-making property and 
merely possible existence is not. 
 The quantificational idiom, existing in reality, as Anselm is using the phrase, 
is a restricted quantifier. Something exists in reality just in case it actually exists. 
For any understandable object x, then, if x actually exists then x is greater than if x 
merely possibly exists. And it is not implausible to maintain, quite generally, for 
any objects x and y, if x actually exists and y merely possibly exists then x is greater 
simpliciter than y.  
 Indeed, merely possible beings of any sort barely exemplify any greatness at 
all. Anselm might exchange Lewis's (2) for (2.1) which makes actual existence a 
great-making property and replaces the relativized greatness-in-a-world with 
greatness simpliciter. 
2.1 (∀x∀w((Ux & Ww & xEw & w = @) ⊃ Vx)) & (∀y∀w((Uy & Ww & ~yEw) ⊃  
       V'y)) & ∀x∀y(Vx & V'y ⊃ xGy) 
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The proposition in (2.1) states that actually existing things are greater simpliciter 
than merely possibly existing things. Being actual is the property that confers 
greatness on existing objects.  
 Of course a merely possible being x might be quite a wonderful being in 
world w. It might be true in w that x is among the best beings that we can imagine. 
But it does not follow from the fact that it is true in w that x is among the greatest 
beings we can imagine that it is true simpliciter that x is among the greatest beings 
we can imagine. If it is true that x is a merely possible being, for instance, then x is 
not among the greatest beings we can imagine. Merely possible beings exemplify 
very little greatness. 
 But then, contrary to (2), x in world w might not be greater than x in world 
v. It is perfectly possible that x does not actually exist. So, x's existence in some 
possible non-actual world w is at best dubiously greater—from the point of view 
of the actual world—than x's non-existence in some other possible non-actual 
world v. It is not obvious in any case that Anselm is committed to taking any 
stand at all on that claim. And this is consistent with the fact that it is true in w 
that x is a much greater being than any being y not in w. 
 But the ontological arguer need not advance any principle as strong as (2.1) 
for her ontological argument. She might argue instead that, for any two 
understandable objects x and y that are otherwise indiscernible with respect to 
their great-making properties, if x actually exists and y merely possibly exists, then 
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x is greater than y. So, we have a restricted version of (2.1) that is even more 
credible than (2.1) 
2.2.  ∀x∀w((Ux & Ww & Px & xEw & w = @) ⊃ Vx)) & ∀y((Uy & Py  
        ∀w(Ww & ~yEw)) ⊃ V'y)) & ∀x∀y(Vx & V'y ⊃ xGy) 
The proposition in (2.2) states that any actually existing being that exemplifies all 
of the great-making properties in P is greater than any merely possibly existing 
things that exemplify all of the great-making properties in P.  
  It is true that unrestrictedly existing beings exemplify many properties 
including many great-making properties. But according to (2.2)—and certainly 
intuitively—exemplifying the property of omniscience in some non-actual region 
of metaphysical space is less impressive and less significant than actually 
exemplifying the property of omniscience. It is not a very impressive or significant 
property of Jones that he is possibly omniscient, if Jones is in fact mostly ignorant. 
 Of course, Anselmians might be persuaded that absolutely unrestricted existence 
is a great-making property rather than actual existence. An Anselmian might be 
persuaded that, if x is an understandable being, then x is greater if it exists in some 
world in the pluriverse than if x does not exist in pluriverse at all. Existing in the 
pluriverse—existing in some possible world—makes everything that does so 
greater than it would be were it to exist in no possible world at all. Premise (2) on 
such a reading amounts to the claim that if x is a possible being then it is greater 
than it would be were x an impossible being. 
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 In that case, we could render premise (2) as stating that if x and y are  
understandable beings and x exists in some possible world and y exists in no 
possible world, then x is greater than y. 
2.3 ∀x∀y(Ux & Uy & ∃w(Ww & xEw) & ~∃w(Ww & yEw)) ⊃ xGy) 
In quasi-English, (2.3) states that, for any understandable beings x and y, if x exists 
in reality and y does not exist in reality then x is greater than y. Any possible 
thing—whether or not it is actual— is greater than any impossible thing, or, 
equivalently, any (unrestrictedly) existing thing is greater than any (unrestrictedly) 
non-existing thing. Here we have the greatness of beings not relativized to 
possible worlds, but relativized to the pluriverse or the largest domain of 
discourse.  
 We might again find some reason to restrict (2.3) to possible beings that 
exemplify all of the great-making properties P. We might find it more credible to 
substitute (2.4) for (2.3). 
2.4. ∀x∀y(Ux & Uy & Px & Py & ∃w(Ww & xEw) & ~∃w(Ww & yEw)) ⊃ xGy) 
(2.4) states that, for any understandable beings x and y, if x and exemplify all of 
the great-making properties in P and x exists in reality and y does not, then x is 
greater than y. Any possible being that exemplifies all of the great-making 
properties in P—whether or not it actually exists—is greater than any impossible 
being. 
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 If a greatest conceivable being is one that exemplifies all of the great-
making properties and exists in reality as a whole—and not necessarily in our 
particular region of it—then theists have reason to celebrate the absolutely 
unrestricted existence of a greatest conceivable being.  
 If something like (2.4) is true, then an unrestrictedly existing God exists in 
the right way for theists—it would be no better were it to actually exist. If an 
unrestrictedly existing God exists in the right way for theists, then we should 
expect it to have the properties of being worthy of devotion and worship, worthy 
of veneration, praise, love, petition, and prayer. It would not be more worthy of 
praise, devotion and worship were it an actually existing being. 
 Of course it might be urged that no merely possible God is the proper 
object of any of those attitudes or a worthy object of those practices. Perhaps 
those attitudes are appropriate only if God exists in our particular region of reality. 
Merely possible Gods stand in no causal relation to our world—they cannot be 
the creator of our world or respond to petitions in our world or take responsibility 
for conditions in our world. Of course such a God would know everything about 
our world, would know our petitions and prayers. Nonetheless perhaps merely 
possible Gods are not the proper object of those attitudes and practices. If so, that 
is just as well. We might better conclude that God exists in just the right way, 
then, only if he actually exists—only if he exists in our neighborhood of reality.  
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 There is another version of premise (2) that is worth considering. Perhaps 
it is a great making property that something exists from the standpoint of every 
possible world. It might be that anything that exists from the standpoint of any 
world is greater than anything that doesn't. Anselmians do have reason to believe 
that the proper object of creation for a being than which none greater is 
conceivable is the totality of reality, the entire pluriverse. It is greater to create all of 
reality—all possibilia and all possible worlds—than to create just part of reality.  
Each possible world constitutes a mere part of total reality. Each candidate for the 
greatest being existing in each world creates, at most, the possible world in which 
he exists.  
 Every object that exists in any possible world, exists simpliciter. So, (2.3)- 
(2.4) distinguish possible beings from impossible beings: any possible being is 
greater than any impossible being. But (2.5) distinguishes objects that exist from the 
standpoint of every possible world from objects that do not. Beings that exist 
from the standpoint of all worlds are greater, according to (2.5), than beings that 
do not. We let 'E!x' stand for x exists from the standpoint of every world. 
2.5. ∀x∀y((Ux & Uy & E!x &~E!y) ⊃ xGy) 
According to (2.5), anything that exists from the standpoint of every possible 
world is greater than anything that doesn't.  
 If something like (2.5) is true, then if God exists from the standpoint of 
every world, then God exists in the right way for theists. A God that exists from 
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the standpoint of every world would have the properties of being worthy of 
devotion and worship, being a proper object of veneration, praise, love, petition, 
and prayer.  
 And there is a rationale for the view that a God that exists from the 
standpoint of every world is the proper object of any of those attitudes. A God 
that creates all of reality—that creates all possibilia in all worlds—cannot exist 
restrictedly. Everything that exists restrictedly exists in some possible world or in 
some sub-region of worlds. But anything that exists in some world w creates, at 
most, the contingent beings in w. So everything that exists restrictedly creates at 
most some sub-region of all reality. 
 Of course there is the alternative of assuming that God exists in every 
possible world. This is the view that all possible worlds overlap with respect to 
God. There are lots of unnecessary costs in the assumption that worlds overlap 
with respect to God.9 But there seems to me the insurmountable cost that if the 
same God literally exists in every possible world, then it is a direct consequence of 
the indiscernibility of identicals that God in any arbitrarily chosen world w must 
be indiscernible from God in any other arbitrarily chose world w'. But if God in w 
is indiscernible from God in w', for any arbitrarily chosen worlds w and w', then 
God has all of his properties essentially. The hyperessentiality conclusion is 
untenable. 
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 If God creates all of metaphysical reality, then God exists from the 
standpoint of every world. There is again a restricted and more plausible version 
of (2.5) available to the ontological arguer. (2.6) restricts (2.5) to beings that exist 
from the standpoint of every possible world otherwise exemplify all of the great-
making properties. 
2.6.  ∀x∀y((Ux & Px & Uy & E!x &~E!y) ⊃ xGy) 
According to (2.6), anything that exemplifies all of the great-making properties in 
P and exists from the standpoint of every possible world is greater than anything 
that doesn't exist from the standpoint of every possible world.  
4. Premise (3) 
 Anselm's third premise says that there is some understandable being x 
whose greatness is not conceivably exceeded by the greatness of anything. The 
greatness of x is not exceeded by the greatness in any conceivable world w of any 
being y. Because Lewis relativizes the greatness of things to possible worlds—
there is no greatness simpliciter, but only greatness-in-world-w—Lewis finds 
Anselm's premise (3) to be multiply ambiguous. Lewis offers at least three ways to 
disambiguate premise (3) in counterpart theory.  
   We have seen that greatnesses, as thought of by the ontological 
arguer, belong to beings paired with worlds; according to the third 
premise, no such pair has a greatness exceeding the greatness of a 
certain understandable being x. 
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   But if greatnesses belong to beings relative to worlds, what are we 
talking about when we say: the greatness of x? Which greatness of x? 
The greatness of x in which conceivable world? Different answers to 
the question yield different nonmodal translations of Premise 3.10 
We might consider a nonmodal translation of premise (3) according to which 
there is an actual object whose greatness in the actual world is not exceeded by the 
greatness of anything in any other possible world. On this understanding of 
premise (3), there is an understandable being x whose greatness in the actual world 
is unexceeded by the greatness of any other being in any other possible world. Lewis 
calls this version of premise (3), 3A. 
3A.  ∃x (Ux & ~∃w ∃y (Ww & ywGx@)) 
According to (3A), there is an understandable being x, such that for no world w 
and being y does the greatness of y in w exceed the greatness of x in the actual 
world. 
 (3A) might be a welcome translation to the ontological arguer—it does 
entail the preferred conclusion that God actually exists—but it is an 
extraordinarily strong claim. It is indeed a much stronger claim than the 
ontological arguer needs. Recall that the ontological arguer in (2.2) claims that a 
being x that otherwise exemplifies all of the great making properties P and actually 
exists is greater than any being y that exemplifies all of the great making properties P 
and does not actually exist. According to (2.2), actual existence is a great making 
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property. And recall that the fact that x is greater than y does not entail that x in 
@ is greater than y in w. For instance, an actual dog might be a greater being than 
a merely possible griffin, even if in the great chain of being an actual griffin is greater 
than an actual dog. So, it might be true that the greatness of the griffin in his own 
world w exceeds the greatness of the dog in his own world @. It might be true in w, 
for instance, that the value of the griffin is V on the scale of greatness and true in 
@ that the value of the dog is V', and necessarily true that anything with value V is 
greater than anything with value V'. The value of the griffin in his own world is 
greater than the actual value of the griffin. But in the actual world, the griffin 
doesn't have much value at all. It is a merely possible being. 
 The view that actual existence confers greatness on beings that existence in 
other regions of the pluriverse does not is not a mere bias on the part of 
ontological arguers. The pluriverse, after all, does not differ ontologically from 
region to region. Griffins in a non-actual region of the pluriverse exist in the very 
same way as dogs do in the actual world. It is not as though non-actual griffins 
have a diminished form of existence that affects their greatness and actual dogs 
have an enhanced form of existence that affects their greatness. So, the distinction 
in greatness between actual beings and non-actual beings can seem invidious. 
 The ontological arguer has a persuasive response. The proper response to 
the fact that you might have discovered the calculus is not to offer you the Fields 
Medal. You might have discovered the calculus and no doubt you do discover the 
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calculus in some other region of the pluriverse. But that possible, non-actual 
achievement is not worthy of the Fields Medal. The actual discovery of the 
calculus, by contrast, is worthy of accolade. Why so? Your possible, non-actual 
achievement is not ontologically any different from your actual achievement. The 
difference is that, despite the ontological symmetry, it is false that you discovered 
the calculus. Mathematicians are not awarded for what might have been. 
 The response is the same for possible, non-actual, Gods. If there is no 
actual God, then it is false that there is a being that exemplifies all of the divine 
attributes. There might have been such a being, and no doubt there is such a being 
existing in some region of the pluriverse, but there isn't such a being. Such a being, 
despite the ontological symmetry with actual beings, is unworthy of worship, 
honor and praise. An actual God does in fact exemplify all of the divine attributes, 
and therefore is worthy of worship, honor and praise. 
 Lewis urges that (3A) is a candidate translation of premise (3), but it is not 
credible without independent evidence. Why believe (3A)? The ontological arguer 
might accept (3A) on the basis of (G). 
G. ∀v(Wv ⊃ ∃x(Ux & ∃w∃y(Ww & ywGxv))) 
G states that, for any world v, there is an understandable being x 
such that for no world w and being y does the greatness of y in w 
exceed the greatness of x in v. . . Why might he accept G? . . . Unless 
inferred from 3C, G does not seem credible. Let v be a bad world—
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say, one containing nothing but a small chunk of mud-and let w be 
the most splendid conceivable world. Then according to G there is 
some understandable being whose greatness in v is unexceeded by 
the greatness in w of anything—even the greatest of the inhabitants 
of w. What could this understandable being be?11 
The principle in (G) is just the generalization of (3A). It entails that, in every 
possible world w, there is a being whose greatness in w is unexceeded by the 
greatness of any other being in any other world v. (G) is true just in case there are 
unexceeded beings, x, y, z, and so on, in possible worlds, w, v, u, and so on, such 
that the greatness of x in its world equals the greatness of y in its world equals the 
greatness of z in its world, and so on.  
 Lewis's counterexample to (G) invites us to consider a possible world w 
that contains nothing except a small chunk of mud and a possible world v that is 
the most splendid conceivable. What being in w is such that its greatness in w is 
unexceeded by the greatness of any being in the splendid world v? Certainly the 
greatness of the mud in w is exceeded by the greatness of almost any being in v. 
 But the ontological arguer can offer some resistance to the chunk of mud 
counterexample. If (G) is true, the ontological arguer might insist, then there are 
no possible worlds like w. There are no possible worlds that include only chunks 
of mud. Lewis's counterexample is only as good as his evidence that there are 
mud-worlds. Is there better reason to believe that there are mud worlds than there 
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is to believe that (G) is true? It's not obvious, so there are epistemological reasons 
for the resistance. Still, it might be urged, if there are no mud worlds, then perhaps 
there are worlds that contain no rational beings at all or inorganic worlds which 
contain no living matter at all or metaphysically nihilistic worlds that include no 
concrete objects at all. Similar counterexamples can be generated on the 
assumption that there are such worlds. 
 Lewis notes that one natural way to argue for (G) is on the basis of (3C), 
the third non-modal translation of premise (3). 
3C. ∃x(Ux&~∃v∃w∃y(Wv & Ww & ywGxv)) 
According to (3C), there is an understandable being x such that for no worlds v 
and w and being y does the greatness of y in w exceed the greatness of x in v. 
 (3C) is true just in case there is some being x such that the greatness of x in 
any world whatsoever is unexceeded by the greatness of any being y in any world. 
If (3C) is true, then there are no counterexamples to (G). Indeed, if (3C) is true, 
then we have a direct argument for (3A). On the trivial assumption that the actual 
world is a possible world, (3C) entails (3A).  
 Is there a reason to believe (3C)? One reason to believe that (3C) is true 
follows from the fact that we understand maximal greatness. Maximally great beings 
are essentially maximally excellent. Plantinga, following Findlay, urges that the 
greatness of a being in a possible world w does not depend merely on the 
properties of that being in w. 
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. . . what it is like in other worlds is also to the point. Those who 
worship God do not think of him as a being that happens to be of 
surpassing excellence in this world but who in some other worlds is 
powerless or uninformed or of dubious moral character.12 
Plantinga distinguishes between the properties of greatness and excellence. He 
allows the excellence of a being in a world w to depend on its (non-world-
indexed) properties in w. But the greatness of a being in any world w depends on 
both the excellence of that being in w and its properties in other possible worlds. 
 We will say that the property of maximal excellence entails the following 
properties.13 
ME. Maximal excellence entails omnipotence, omniscience, rational perfection,  
        and moral perfection. 
(ME) just tells us that, necessarily, something is maximally excellent in a world w 
only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, rationally perfect and morally perfect in w. 
Presumably, something might be maximally excellent in some worlds and not in 
others. (ME) tells us nothing about whether a being that is possibly maximally 
excellent in w enjoys any excellence at all in w. We'll say that a being has maximal 
greatness only if it is essentially maximally excellent.  
MG. Maximal greatness entails maximal excellence in every possible world. 
 According to (MG), a being is maximally great only if it exists in every 
possible world and is essentially maximally excellent. It follows from (ME) and 
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(MG) that a being is maximally great only if it necessarily exists and is essentially 
omnipotent, essentially omniscient, essentially morally perfect and essentially 
rationally perfect.  
 There is also good reason to believe that there is ontological space for 
maximally great beings under Lewisian modal assumptions. Ross Cameron 
confirms the view expressed above, that God is the creator of reality, not merely 
particular regions of reality.  
Either each God created the world He exists at, or He didn’t. If the 
former, then there is no sense in which God is responsible for all of 
creation since, for the modal realist, all of creation is the pluriverse 
of worlds, not just the actual world. But if there are Gods that didn’t 
create the world they exist at then it’s not clear why they deserve to 
be called ‘God’ ; being the creator is essential to God if anything is, 
so a God that didn’t create the world He exists at would seem not 
deserve the title, thus undercutting the claim that He is in fact a 
counterpart of the actual God, and hence undercutting the claim 
that God is a necessary existent. But there is no need for the theist 
modal realist to go the route of postulating distinct counterparts of 
our actual God at each non-actual world.14 
But might possible worlds—possible regions of reality—overlap with respect to 
God? Might God—the very same God—exist in every possible world? There are 
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no objections to that view from modal realism. If God has all of his intrinsic 
properties essentially, then God might well exist in every possible world. Lewis 
allows that possible worlds might overlap with respect to universals precisely 
because universals have all of their intrinsic properties essentially.  
If two worlds are said to overlap by having a coin in common, and 
if this coin is supposed to be wholly round in one world and wholly 
octagonal in the other, I stubbornly ask what shape it is, and insist 
that shape is not a relation to worlds.…I do not see any parallel 
objection if worlds are said to overlap by sharing a universal. What 
contingent, nonrelational property of the universal could we put in 
place of [the] shape of the coin in raising the problem? I cannot 
think of any.15 
 Of course, one may doubt whether God does have all of his intrinsic 
properties essentially. God's anger and disappointment are presumably intrinsic 
properties, but it is hardly an essential property of God to be angry and 
disappointed.  
 In any case, Lewis would no doubt grant that we understand maximal 
excellence, so by premise (1) there are maximally excellent beings in some worlds. 
But how could we understand maximal excellence and not understand maximal 
greatness? A maximally great being just is a maximally excellent being that exists in 
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more than one world. Despite these observations, Lewis simply rejects the thesis 
that a maximally great being is understandable.  
[The ontological arguer] might assume that for every description he 
understands, there is some understandable being answering to that 
description. But what of such well-understood descriptions as 
'largest prime" or "round square"?16  
 The point presumably is that there is not an understandable being for every 
understandable description. And if it were insisted that, for some plausible notion 
of understandable, there is an understandable being for every understandable 
description, then Lewis urges that he would have to reject premise (1) in Anselm's 
argument. He would reject the thesis that every understandable being exists in 
some world or other. So, either there are understandable descriptions for which 
there are no understandable beings or there are understandable beings for which 
there are no (unrestrictedly) existing beings. Either way, the fact that maximal 
greatness is understandable does not entail that there (unrestrictedly) exists a 
maximally great being.  
 Ontological saturation principles—and perhaps, principles of plenitude—
are also ineffective approaches to supporting (3C). Consider the principle of 
saturation that any sentence saying that there exists an understandable being of so-
and-so description is true unless provably false. It follows directly from such an 
ontological saturation principle that (3C) is true. But that is no reason to believe 
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(3C). Lewis urges that saturation principles prove too much. (*) also follows from 
such an ontological saturation principle. 
(*) ∃x∃w∃v (Ux & Ww & Wv & Vy (y ≠ x ⊃ xwGyw) &  
     ∃y(yvGxv) 
If the Principle of Saturation supports 3C, it should equally well 
support (*); otherwise it makes a discrimination unjustified by any 
visibly relevant difference between 3C and (*). But (*) is 
incompatible with 3C. So if the Principle of Saturation supports 3C, 
then it is a bad principle.17 
(*) states that there is an understandable being which is greater than anything else 
in some world, but is exceeded in greatness in another world. So, clearly, (*) is 
inconsistent with (3C). But it is also true, as Lewis notes, that (*) is no less 
supported by the saturation principle than (3C). The principle of saturation entails 
inconsistent propositions and ought to be rejected. 
5. A Better Translation of Premise (3) 
 According to Lewis, the translation in (3A) is necessary to any valid 
rendering of Anselm's argument in counterpart theory. Only the translations in 
(3A) and (3C) make the argument valid, and (3C) entails (3A). Since Lewis argues 
that there is no non-circular reason to believe (3A), he concludes that Anselm's 
argument is unsound.  
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 But we noted that the ontological arguer might well reject (3A), too. (3A) 
expresses a much stronger claim that the ontological arguer needs, and perhaps 
much stronger than the ontological arguer believes. According to (3A), there is an 
understandable being x, such that for no world w and being y does the greatness 
of y in w exceed the greatness of x in the actual world. The ontological arguer in 
(2.2) claims that a being x that otherwise exemplifies all of the great making 
properties P and actually exists is greater than any being y that exemplifies all of the 
great making properties P and does not actually exist. According to (2.2), actual 
existence is a great making property. And the fact that x is greater than y does not 
entail that x in @ is greater than y in w. The ontological arguer might therefore 
wish to replace (3A) with (3A'). 
3A'. ∃x(Ux & @Ix & ∀y~(yGx)) 
According to (3A'), there is some actual being whose greatness is unexceeded by 
any other existing being. The quantifiers in (3A') are all unrestricted. The greatness 
of x exceeds—actually exceeds—the greatness of all other existing beings—all 
beings that exist anywhere in metaphysical space, any beings that exist anywhere in 
reality.  If there is a greatest conceivable being, it would have to have the property 
of being actual.  
 (3A') does not make the strong claim that there actually exists a being x 
whose greatness in the actual world is unexceeded by the greatness of any other 
being y in its world w. That extreme claim, we have found, is otiose. The 
 29 
ontological arguer wants to show that there is some actual being whose greatness 
is actually unexceeded by any other existing being.  
 But what reason is there to believe (3A')? There is an understandable being 
x that exemplifies all of the great-making properties P. According to (1), x exists in 
some possible world or other. According to (2.2) any actually existing being that 
exemplifies all of the great-making properties in P is greater than merely possibly 
existing things that exemplify all of the great-making properties in P. So, x 
exemplifies all of the great making properties only if x actually exists. 
 But, once again, why does actual existence confer greatness on x while 
possible existence does not? The answer is not far to seek. Only an actually 
existing God has the properties of being worthy of devotion and worship, worthy 
of veneration, praise, love, petition, and prayer. No being in any other world—no 
matter how great that being is in its world—is great enough to be worthy of 
devotion, worship, praise, honor, love or prayer. No being in any other world—no 
matter how great that being is in its world—is the proper object of these religious 
attitudes. It is the actual existence of God that makes these attitudes appropriate 
to the actually existing God. It is the possible non-actual existence of other great 
beings that makes these attitudes inappropriate to the possible non-actual beings.  
 Concerning the conclusion of Anselm's ontological argument, Lewis 
observes the following 
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So our nonmodal translation of the conclusion resembles 3A, our 
first version of Premise 3: 
C. ∃x(xE@ & ~∃w∃y (Ww & ywGx@)) 
(There is a being x existing in the actual world such that for no 
world w and being y does the greatness of y in w exceed the 
greatness of x in the actual world.)18 
But as we have been at pains to show, the ontological arguer does not want to 
show anything like (C). The conclusion in (C) is much too strong a claim for the 
arguer to establish.  The premises (1), (2.2) and (3A') do not establish (C). Rather 
the premises (1), (2.2) and (3A') establish the conclusion in (C').  
C'.  ∃x(xE@ & ∀y~(yGx)) 
There is a being x existing in the actual world such that for no being y does y's 
greatness exceed x's greatness. 
6. Existing from the Standpoint of Every World 
 We noted in section (3) above that, if God creates all of metaphysical 
reality—all possible worlds and all possibilia—then God must exist from the 
standpoint of every world.19 But then if God exists from the standpoint of every 
possible world, then God exists in the right way for theists. A God that creates all 
of reality and exists from the standpoint of every world might well be greater than 
any being—however great that being is in its own world(s)—that exists in some 
possible world or other in metaphysical space. A God that creates all of reality and 
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exists from the standpoint of every world might well be greater than any being 
existing in the actual world, however great that being actually is.  
 A being that exists from the standpoint of every world would have the 
properties of being worthy of devotion and worship, being a proper object of 
veneration, praise, love, petition, and prayer. And, as we have noted, there is a 
rationale for the view that a God that exists from the standpoint of every world is 
the proper object of any of those attitudes. A being that exists from the standpoint 
of every world can create all of the pluriverse—all of creatable reality.  
 There is again a restricted and more plausible version of (2.5) available to 
the ontological arguer. (2.6) above restricts (2.5) to beings that exist from the 
standpoint of every possible world and otherwise exemplify all of the great-
making properties. Recall that, according to (2.6), anything that exemplifies all of 
the great-making properties in P and exists from the standpoint of every possible 
world is greater than anything that doesn't exist from the standpoint of every 
possible world.  
 If existing necessarily—existing from the standpoint of every possible 
world—is a great-making property, rather than merely actually existing, then (2.6) 
might be found appealing. Corresponding to (2.6) is (3E) 
3E. ∃x∀w(Ux & wE!x & ~∃y(yGx)) 
According to (3E), there is an understandable being existing from the standpoint 
of every world whose greatness is unexceeded by any other existing being. The 
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quantifiers in (3E) are all unrestricted. The greatness of x exceeds the greatness of 
all other existing beings y—all beings that exist anywhere in the totality of 
creation, anywhere in metaphysical reality. And our corresponding conclusion is 
(C''). 
C''. ∃x(xE!@ & ~∃y(yGx)) 
There is a being x existing from the standpoint of the actual world such that for 
no being y does y's greatness exceed x's greatness. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 The interest and advantage of Lewis's approach to Anselm's ontological 
argument is that it makes a perfectly extensional interpretation of the argument 
possible. The modal reduction puts us in a position to assess the credibility of 
Anselm's premises. The translation of Anselm's ontological argument into a non-
modal argument permits the application of the standards of classical logic to 
determine the cogency of Anselm's argument. 
 The central difficulty in Lewis's versions of Anselm's ontological argument 
are his translations of premises (2) and (3). According to Lewis, (2) states that, for 
any understandable being x, and for any worlds w and v, if x exists in w but x does 
not exist in v, then the greatness of x in w exceeds the greatness of x in v. That is, 
whatever exists in some world is greater in that world than it is in any world in 
which it does not exist. (2) is a claim about the greatness of objects in worlds. But 
because (2) is formulated in terms of greatness in worlds, Lewis's greatest 
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conceivable being in (3) requires a formulation as strong as (3A). According to 
(3A), there is an understandable being x, such that for no world w and being y 
does the greatness of y in w exceed the greatness of x in the actual world. 
 But Anselm is offering an argument that does not rely on such radical and 
implausible premises. Anselm is arguing from the premise that actual existence is a 
great-making property. For any beings x and y sharing all of the divine attributes 
P, the actual existence of x and mere possible existence of y makes x greater than 
y. That can be true though the greatness of x in the actual world does not exceed 
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